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Introduction
Patent laws are, in some ways, like secret agents. Both are given
rights that supersede the law for the benefit of the public. In the
American system of free trade, patent law carves out an incongruous
protection for inventors in order to encourage development. When
drafting the original patent laws, Thomas Jefferson recognized that
the grant of patent rights was anathema to a free economy but
necessary to promote innovation.1 As a result, patent holders, like
secret agents, don't always interact smoothly with the rest of the
public. This incongruity is highlighted in antitrust cases involving
patents.
For instance, imagine that Microsoft (everyone's favorite natural
monopolist) included a patented toolbox2 as an integral element of
Windows 98, making it impossible for developers to write software for
it without licensing that toolbox. Microsoft could then refuse to
license the toolbox, thereby cornering the windows software market
by leveraging the dominance of the Windows operating system. This
conduct, on its own, would constitute monopoly leveraging which
violates antitrust laws. However, this conduct would also be protected
by the patent laws. Courts are left to balance the patent right to refuse
to deal and the antitrust duty to deal.
In analyzing this conflict, this note first compares the general
principals underlying patent and antitrust laws and explains why
conflicts are destined to arise. It then focuses on a specific type of
antitrust violation, monopoly leveraging, where this conflict is
currently a key issue. Finally, this note explains how this conflict arose
in a landmark case and how the Ninth Circuit resolved the issue.
Ultimately this note demonstrates that the two areas of the law can be
reconciled by looking to their shared underlying principals.
I
The Conflict Between Patent and Antitrust
One obvious area of tension is between patent and antitrust laws.
While patent law is generally concerned with creating limited
monopolies, 3 antitrust is generally concerned with preventing them.4
1. See VI Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 181 (Washington ed.).
2. A toolbox is a software interface that allows one program to work with another.
Without access to the toolbox, developers would have a difficult time making their
software work with the operating system.
3. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969).
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Patent law contains provisions that accommodate antitrust law so that
they frequently fit together like a puzzle. 5 However, there are
instances where the pieces aren't quite the right shape.
A. Patent Rights
Patent law grants monopoly-like rights to inventors for the
purpose of encouraging innovation.6 These rights are granted for a
very limited class of inventions that fit into a very narrow statutory
definition.' Patent rights allow the patent holder exclusive control
over the patented invention, including discretion as to who may
manufacture, sell, or distribute the subject of the patent.' This control
includes the right to unilaterally refuse to license or sell the patented
product.9
Control over the patented invention assures that the inventor will
reap a reward for her innovation and will be able to control its use, at
least to some extent." That control encourages invention and
promotes investment in the inventive process. Patent law also
promotes the sharing of information with the public by requiring full
disclosure of the patented subject matter." This disclosure encourages
further innovation and development.
Though patent protections are limited to the single invention that
is the subject of the patent, they grant the holder very strong rights in
that product. Without the protection of those strong rights, inventors
would be less inclined to pursue innovation, and those who did would
be more inclined to hide their findings from the public. Thus, to
encourage innovation and economic efficiency, inventors must be
granted some exclusive rights in their inventions.
B. Antitrust Prohibitions
Antitrust law seeks to encourage innovation and economic
efficiency by preventing monopolistic conduct. 2 Antitrust law allows
the government or private individuals to seek relief against companies
with market power who engage in anti-competitive conduct that may
4. See 15 U.SC. §§ 1, 2 (1996).
5. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1996).
6. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
7. See 35 U.S.C §§ 101-103 (1996).
8. See id. § 271.
9. See id.
10. See SCM, 645 F.2d at 1203.
11. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112-113 (1996).
12. See id.
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lead to a monopoly.13 The law does not punish companies that happen
to have a monopoly in a market but rather seeks to prevent anti-
competitive conduct which leads to the acquisition or maintenance of
a monopoly.14
Companies with monopoly power tend to produce fewer goods
than the market demands and charge higher prices for those goods.
15
They also generally put less effort into research and development
because there is no competition to keep up with.16 Antitrust law
encourages innovation and efficiency by preventing monopolies from
expanding. Though it would be unfair to punish companies that come
by monopoly power naturally, the law does not hesitate to punish
those who actively engage in anti-competitive conduct designed to
increase their monopoly power.17 Thus, to encourage innovation and
economic efficiency, antitrust laws seek to prevent conduct intended
to eliminate competition in the market.
C. Conflict
Though the goals of patent and antitrust law are the same, the
two differ in how they reach those ends. Patent law grants monopoly-
like rights, while antitrust law seeks to prevent them. This creates a
potential for conflict, particularly in patent infringement cases or
antitrust cases where a patent is involved.
Consider the Microsoft Windows 98 example again. According to
patent law Microsoft would have the right to refuse to license its
toolbox, preventing competitors from developing software for
Windows 98. Now imagine that Corel Corp. considered this conduct
misuse of the patent, and used the toolbox to develop its Word Perfect
program, a direct competitor to Microsoft's word processing software.
Microsoft could sue Corel for infringement and Corel might invoke
misuse as a defense. 18 Interestingly, Corel would lose this dispute.
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1996).
14. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
15. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 403b (1995).
16. See id.
17. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
18. "Patent misuse is an affirmative defense to an accusation of patent infringement,
the successful assertion of which 'requires that the alleged infringer show that the patentee
has impermissibly broadened the "physical or temporal scope" of the patent grant with
anticompetitive effect'." Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (citing Windsurfing Int'l., Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed .Cir. 1986)).
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In 1988, Congress passed the Patent Misuse Reform Act.' 9 The
1988 amendments added that "no patent owner otherwise entitled to
relief for infringement.., shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of
misuse ... by reason of having.., refused to license or use any rights
to the patent., 20 Corel Corp could not rely on misuse as a defense to
infringement in this case because Microsoft's refusal to license its
patent is explicitly exempted from the misuse doctrine by the Patent
Misuse Reform Act.2' Even though Microsoft's conduct is anti-
competitive, that does not give Corel Corp the right to infringe the
patent.
Corel Corp, does however, have another alternative. Although
patent misuse is neither a defense to infringement nor a cause of
action, Corel Corp can sue Microsoft for violation of antitrust laws.
Microsoft's refusal to license the toolbox is a use of its power in the
operating system market to gain monopoly power in the software
application market, which is a form of anti-competitive conduct




Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization or
attempts to monopolize any part of trade or commerce.22 There are
two elements of monopolization: power and conduct.23 Power is the
ability "to control prices or exclude competition." 24 A company's
power is determined by its share of a relevant market and the barriers
competitors face in trying to enter that market.25
Conduct is the use of monopoly power "to foreclose competition,
to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor." 26 Where
a monopolist has market power, the Sherman Act prohibits conduct
19. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1996).
20. Id. § 271(d).
21. Id.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
23. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
24. Id. at 571.
25. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956);
Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1439 (9th Cir. 1995).
26. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992)
(hereinafter Kodak I).
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"characterized as 'exclusionary' or 'anti-competitive' 
... or
'predatory,' to use a word that scholars seem to favor."27
Monopoly leveraging is simply a form of monopolization that
occurs when a company with power in one market uses it to
monopolize another related market.28 Leveraging consists of the two
monopolization factors, plus an additional factor that the
monopolization must occur in a separate market from that in which
the original monopoly is held.
One common form of monopolization is refusing to deal with
competitors. Generally, a private business has the right to select who
it does business with and to refuse to do business with whomever it
pleases.29 However, this right is neither absolute nor free from
regulation.3" When used as a purposeful means of monopolizing
commerce, a refusal to deal constitutes monopolization in violation of
the Sherman Act.3 This was the situation in the landmark case Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
3 2
In Aspen, the defendant, Aspen Skiing Co. ("Ski Co.") owned
three ski mountains in the Aspen area.33 The plaintiff, Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp. ("Highlands") owned the fourth mountain in
the area.34 Between 1962 and 1978 the companies jointly sold some
form of all-Aspen ski tickets that allowed skiers access to all four
mountains. 35 In 1978, Ski Co. discontinued the 4-area ticket and took
27. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,602 (1985).
28. See Alaska Airlines Inc. v. United Airlines Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547 (9th Cir. 1991).
There has been some debate in the courts as to whether monopoly leveraging is an
independent claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak,
Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979), the court held Kodak liable for using its monopoly
power "to gain a competitive advantage ... without an attempt to monopolize the second
market." The Supreme Court, however, seems to have rejected this theory. See Spectrum
Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 448 (1993) (holding "§2 makes the conduct of a
single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do
so."). In a footnote to Kodak I, the Court stated that "power gained through some natural
and legal advantage such as patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability
if 'a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the
next."' 504 U.S. at 479, n.29 (quoting Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594, 611 (1953)). These cases indicate that monopoly leveraging exists, but only as a form
of monopolization. As such, monopoly leveraging occurs only where conduct monopolizes
or is intended to monopolize.
29. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
33. Id. at 589.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 589-90.
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other actions that made it difficult for Highlands to independently
offer a multi-area pass.36 Highlands filed suit alleging that Ski Co. had
violated §2 of the Sherman Act.37 The Court held that Ski Co.'s
refusal to deal with a competitor violated §2 of the Sherman Act
because the refusal was exercised as a means of monopolizing the
market.38
Ski Co.'s conduct alone did not end the Court's analysis. Even
though the Court upheld the jury finding that Ski Co.'s conduct was
monopolistic, it would have condoned that conduct if Ski Co. had a
valid business justification.39 Had Ski Co. been able to show that its
conduct was motivated by concerns about efficiency, then its conduct
would have been justifiable.4 ° Though § 2 of the Sherman Act does
not require specific intent,41 Ski Co. could only be liable if its conduct
was monopolistic. Thus, if it had a valid business justification for its
conduct, Ski Co. would not have engaged in predatory conduct in
violation of the Sherman Act.
Consider the Microsoft toolbox example again. Microsoft has
monopoly power in the operating system market. By refusing to
license the toolbox, Microsoft would push other developers out of the
software market and thereby gain monopoly power in that market. By
using its power in the operating system market to gain monopoly
power in the software market, Microsoft would commit leveraging.
Microsoft might defend it actions by claiming that its refusal to
license the toolbox is a valid exercise of its patent rights. This exposes
an unresolved tension in the law. Under antitrust law, Microsoft's
refusal to license the toolbox is prohibited as anti-competitive
conduct. Under patent law, Microsoft's refusal to license the toolbox
is a valid exercise of its rights. The same conduct is explicitly approved
by one law and explicitly prohibited by another. This particular issue
was raised in Image Technical Services v. Kodak.42
36. See id. at 593. Ski Co. refused to sell any of its passes to Highland at either a
discount or retail price. See id. Highland tried to market its own multi-area passes by
including coupons for Ski Co. mountains, but Ski Co. refused to accept them. See id. at
594.
37. See id. at 595.
38. See id. at 601-02.
39. See id. at 608.
40. See id. at 608-09.
41. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
42. Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997)
(hereinafter Kodak II).
1998] LICENSED To KILL
III
Kodak
In the late 1970s, Eastman Kodak Company ("Kodak") sold
micrographic and photocopier equipment as well as most of the parts
and service for that equipment.a3 At that time, the service market
paled in comparison to the equipment market and was largely ignored
by manufacturers.44  In the early 1980s, independent service
organizations (ISOs) began to enter the service market.4 5 Because of
their small size, ISOs tailored their business such that they could
frequently offer better service than manufacturers at much lower
prices.4 6 Kodak sold its parts to ISOs because their work did not really
cut into Kodak's profits and because it encouraged customers to buy
Kodak brands.
By the mid-1980s the market was changing. The demand for new
equipment decreased while the demand for service increased. 47 ISOs
were no longer harmless beneficiaries of the equipment market, but
rather had become strong competitors for the essential service market.
ISOs threatened Kodak's service market by taking away significant
and lucrative accounts. 48 ISOs also put a downward pressure on profit
margins by forcing Kodak to compete. 49 In addition, Kodak faced the
threat of larger companies entering the micrographics and
photocopier service markets, cutting further into its own client base.50
Kodak did not sit idly by and let ISOs capture even more of the
growing service market. In 1986, Kodak implemented a policy of
selling parts only to buyers who repaired their own machines and
refusing to deal with ISOs. 51 As a result, some ISOs, went out of
43. See Kodak I, 504 U.S. 454.
44. See Ronald S. Katz, If Kodak Is Just a 'Summary Judgment Case,' Why are We Still
Discussing it Three Years Later?, 12 COMPUTER LAWYER 11, 11-12 (Oct. 1995).
45. See Jonathan M. Jacobson, 'Kodak': Daguerreotype or Laser Projection?, NEW
YORK LAW JOURNAL, July 20, 1992, at 5.
46. See Appellee's Opening Brief at 7, Kodak 11, 125 F.3d 1195 (Nos. 96-15293, 96-
15296) ("For example, Kodak charged one service customer $200,000 per year with a four-
hour response time, but that customer switched to an ISO that charged $100,000 per year
and provided an on-site technician.").
47. See Ronald S. Katz, Eastman Kodak v ITS: The Downfall of the Chicago School, 9
COMPUTER LAWYER 1, 1 (July 1992).
48. See Appellee's Opening Brief, supra note 46 (Kodak responded after an ISO
wrested away the State of California's service work).
49. See Katz, supra note 44.
50. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
51. See Thomas E. Kauper, Antitrust in 1992: The Year of the Storyteller, 61 Antitrust
L.J. 347, 347 (Jan. 1993).
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business and others were forced to give up service contracts for Kodak
machines. 52
The ISOs filed suit in the Northern District of California alleging
that Kodak's behavior violated the Sherman Act.53 The District Court
granted summary judgment for Kodak on the grounds that the
plaintiff failed to show market power and that the business policies at
issue did not violate antitrust law.54 The ISOs appealed and the
Supreme Court reversed summary judgment, holding that Kodak may
have had power in the market for parts for its machines and that the
business policies at issue might have violated the Sherman Act.55 The
case was remanded for trial, and in 1995 a jury found for the ISOs,
awarding a trebled verdict totaling approximately $76 million.56
A. Ninth Circuit Holding
Kodak appealed and the Ninth Circuit upheld the verdict.57
Among its other arguments on appeal, Kodak raised the defense that
its refusal to deal was a valid exercise of intellectual property rights as
an ordinary means of competition.58 The Ninth Circuit recognized that
this was an issue of first impression which raised "unresolved
questions concerning the relationship between federal antitrust,
copyright and patent laws." 59
The Ninth Circuit held that "neither patent nor copyright holders
are immune from antitrust liability."6° The Supreme Court has
recognized that patent laws "are in pari materia with antitrust laws
and modify them pro tanto (as far as the patent laws go)."'61 The Ninth
Circuit further acknowledged that patent holders may generally refuse
to sell or license protected products unilaterally. 62 However, it relied
52. See id.; see also Appellee's Opening Brief, supra note 46.
53. See Kodak !, 504 U.S. at 451; see also Sherman Act 15 U.S.C §§ 1-2 (1996). Section
1 of the Sherman Act prohibits combination in restraint of trade, and Section 2 prohibits,
monopolization. ITS dropped the Section 1 claim at trial, but pursued the monopolization
claim.
54. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
$68,402 (1988).
55. See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 480-81.
56. See Image Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
171,624 (N.D. Cal. Sept 18, 1995).
57. See Kodak 11, 125 F.3d at 1195.
58. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 20-21, Kodak 11, 125 F.3d 1195 (Nos. 96-15293,
96-15296).
59. See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1214.
60. Id. at 1215.
61. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964).
62. See Kodak H, 125 F.3d at 1215.
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on the Supreme Court's holding in Kodak I that "power gained
through some natural advantage such as patent, copyright, or business
acumen can give rise to liability if 'a seller exploits his dominant
position in one market to expand his empire into the next.'
' 63
Based on these principles, the Ninth Circuit upheld the jury's
finding that Kodak's unilateral refusal to deal with ISO's was anti-
competitive and violated the Sherman Act.64 However, the court was
not content to leave the decision at that. It feared that without firmer
boundaries, claims against patent holders would proliferate because
any unilateral use of a patent could potentially be leveraging. 65 Under
existing law, the defense of these claims would rest largely on the
validity of the business justifications asserted as defenses. 66 Given the
frequently disputed factual nature of these cases and the possibility of
treble damages, the Ninth Circuit believed that if it failed to give more
weight to intellectual property rights, patent holders would have less
incentive to seek patents. 67 Such a result would conflict with the
shared goals of patent and antitrust law, thereby undermining both.6s
To avoid this problem, the court adopted a presumption that a desire
to exclude others from a patented work is a valid business justification
for a refusal to deal.69
IV
Analysis
A. Harmonizing Patent and Antitrust Laws
1. Patent Rights v. Antitrust Prohibitions
The Ninth Circuit holding in Kodak II is supported by existing
law and policy. Generally, a monopolist's unilateral refusal to deal
cannot lead to liability if exercised as a means of maintaining a
lawfully acquired patent monopoly." The Supreme Court in Lorain
63. Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 479 n. 29 (quoting Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953) and citing Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Leitch Mfg.
Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938)).
64. See Kodak 11, 125 F.3d at 1217.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1217-18.
67. See id. at 1218.
68. See id.; see also supra Part 1.
69. See id.
70. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994);
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Journal v. United States recognized that the general right to refuse to
deal is not absolute.71 The Court held that the right is extinguished
when used for anti-competitive purposes.72 Patent laws do not purport
to change that principle. Patent law does not trump antitrust law 73 and
cannot be used as a machete to chop through its prohibitions. Like the
common law right to refuse to deal, the patent right to refuse to deal is
not absolute. For example, a monopoly's unilateral refusal to license
may be deemed exclusionary,74 particularly when the conduct affects
markets beyond that of the patented good. Thus, a unilateral refusal
to deal by a lawful monopolist runs the risk of violating antitrust law,
even where a patent is involved.
2. Policy Goals
The Ninth Circuit holding in Kodak II also harmonizes the shared
policy goals of patent and antitrust laws of "encouraging innovation,
industry, and competition." 75 When a monopolist uses a patent to
eliminate competitors and create a monopoly in a downstream
market, it undermines those goals.
Patent laws encourage innovation and competition by granting a
limited monopoly in a patented product to the inventor.7 6 Potential
inventors are encouraged to put resources towards development to
benefit from the rights granted by a patent. 77 Inevitably this increases
competition, since only the first inventor to develop a new product
and file for patent protection will benefit. However, patent law seeks
to grant this benefit by means tailored to the specific invention.78 If
patents swept too broadly they would grant over-broad monopolies
and would actually stifle innovation as a result.
For that very reason, Section 2 of the Sherman Act specifically
prohibits this kind of conduct.79 The Sherman Act seeks to encourage
innovation and competition by preventing monopolists from
expanding their empires through predatory conduct.8" Generally,
Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., 830 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987).
71. 342 U.S. 143,155 (1951).
72. See id.
73. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964).
74. See Data Gen., 36 F.3d at 1187.
75. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
76. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
77. See id.
78. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1996).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1996).
80. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985).
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monopolists sell fewer products than the market demands at a higher
cost while putting fewer resources back into development.81 Since they
have little competition and their strength inhibits the entry of new
competitors, monopolists can continue this behavior for some time to
the detriment of consumers. While antitrust law does not prohibit
monopolies gained through a natural advantage, it does seek to
prohibit expansion of that power through anti-competitive conduct.82
Permitting monopolists to leverage their power into other markets by
virtue of a patent expands the breadth of that patent and allows them
to prolong the type of behavior that stifles competition and
innovation. This would be contrary to the goals of antitrust and patent
law.
3. Valid Business Justification
The Ninth Circuit's analysis includes a further guarantee against
limiting a monopolist's lawful and competitive exercise of patent
rights. A monopolist's conduct, even a refusal to deal with a
downstream competitor, is justified if the monopolist has valid
business reasons. 83 A valid business justification must advance a pro-
competitive purpose and it must be the real reason for the conduct. 84
"In general, a business justification is valid if it relates directly or
indirectly to the enhancement of consumer welfare."85 For instance,
quality control is a valid business justification for what would
otherwise be considered predatory conduct. 8 In fact, Kodak did raise
quality control as a justification for its conduct, but the jury found that
that was not its primary motivation. Had the jury found otherwise,
Kodak would not have been liable. As the Supreme Court noted in
Aspen Skiing, "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is
doing., 87 If a monopolist has a legitimate pro-competitive justification
for its conduct, then it cannot accurately be described as predatory or
anti-competitive. Therefore, it fails to meet the conduct element
required to constitute monopolization. Monopolists accused of using
81. AREEDA, supra note 15, at § 403b.
82. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
83. See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 483.
84. See id. at 483-84.
85. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1183 (1st Cir.
1994).
86. See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1350-51 (9th Cir.
1987).
87. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985)
(citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945)).
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their power to monopolize will always have an opportunity to justify
their conduct as a defense against the claim.
B. Opposition to Ninth Ciruit Harmonization
The Ninth Circuit did recognize that "[c]ourts do not generally
view a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a patent as
'exclusionary conduct."' 88 However, the court held that there are
limits to this general rule. 89 Kodak cited the cases from which the
court derived the general rule as standing for the principle that
"without exception.., a patent owner, even a monopolist, has no duty
to sell patented goods or license patented technology to its
competitors." 90 Contrary to Kodak's argument, each of these cases
actually supports the holding of the Ninth Circuit.
1. Data General
Data General involved a situation analogous to the Kodak case.
Data General Corporation ("DG") produced a line of computers,
called the MV, and developed a sophisticated software diagnostic
program for those computers called "ADEX."91 DG sued Grumman
Systems Support Corporation ("Grumman") for infringing DG's
copyright by using ADEX without a license.92  Grumman
counterclaimed that DG's refusal to license ADEX constituted
monopoly leveraging. 93
DG urged the First Circuit to adopt an irrebuttable presumption
that a unilateral refusal to license intellectual property can never
constitute exclusionary conduct.94 The First Circuit refused to adopt
such a strong rule. It did dismiss Grumman's counterclaim on the
grounds that DG was merely protecting its copyright.95 However,
unlike the ISOs in Kodak I, Grumman could have developed its own
diagnostic software independently. More importantly, since DG's
copyright was in the computer service market, DG's conduct served
only to exercise the competitive advantage granted by that copyright
88. Kodak 11, 125 F.3d at 1216 (citing Data Gen., 36 F.3d at 1186; Miller Insituform
Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987)).
89. Id.
90. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 58, at 19.
91. Data Gen., 36 F.3d at 1152.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1184.
95. Id. at 1188.
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rather than to broaden it into another downstream market.96 Like the
Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit rejected a bright line rule that would
shield intellectual property owners from liability for antitrust
violations. Though the court reached a different result, it did so based
on conduct that lacked the predatory nature of Kodak's refusal to
deal.
2. Miller Insituform
Miller Insituform involved a patented process for rehabilitating
pipelines called the Insituform process.97 Insituform of North America
("INA") held the patent rights for the entire United States, except
California, and sublicensed that patent to various companies. 98 Miller
Insituform, Inc. ("MII") sued INA for antitrust violations when INA
discontinued MII's license.99 M11 claimed that INA discontinued the
license on a technicality so that it could remove MII from the market
and take its customers. 100
The Sixth Circuit dismissed MII's claims on the grounds that "the
appellee merely exercised his power to exclude others from using the
Insituform process, as was his right." 10 1 Since INA was merely
maintaining its lawfully acquired monopoly power, the court held it
could not be liable. 10 2 However, the court did not adopt an absolute
rule. It noted that even the appellee admitted that "a 'patent
monopolist' is not immune from the antitrust laws."'0 3 Moreover, as in
Data General, the appellee was not seeking to expand its power into
another market, but merely to exercise its competitive advantage
within a single market. 1°4 Thus, Miller Insituform supports the
conclusion that patent rights do not trump antitrust prohibitions, but
that the non-predatory exercise of patent rights does not amount to
monopolization.
96. Id.




101. Id. at 609.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 607 n. 2.




SCM involved Xerox Corporation's refusal to license its patents
for plain paper copiers."0 5 Xerox held a monopoly on plain paper
copiers based on these patents. 116 SCM claimed that Xerox's refusal to
license those patents constituted a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act
because it was exercised to maintain a monopoly.10 7
The Second Circuit held for Xerox, explaining that "a patent
holder is permitted to maintain his patent monopoly through conduct
permissible under the patent laws."' 0 8 However, the Second Circuit
also stopped short of a blanket rule. It held that "a concerted refusal
to license patents is no less unlawful than other concerted refusals to
deal." 109 The essential element of the Second Circuit's rule is that a
patent holder may maintain a patent monopoly as allowed by patent
law.110 A patent holder "abuses his patent by attempting to enlarge his
monopoly beyond the scope of the patent granted him."'111 SCM
reinforces the Ninth Circuit holding that a patent is not a shield
against antitrust liability and that conduct which expands the breadth
of the patent may lead to liability.
In Kodak II the Ninth Circuit held that a patent holder may
violate antitrust laws by engaging in predatory conduct. 112 Data
General, Miller Insituform, and SCM all support this holding. Though
each case led to a different result, their reasonings comport with the
Ninth Circuit's holding. In each case the courts held that the parties
were not liable for antitrust violations because they had merely
exercised the power lawfully granted by their intellectual property.
However, each court acknowledged that the parties could have been
liable had they engaged in conduct which expanded their power
beyond the limited grant of their intellectual property.
C. Presumption
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Kodak II opens up a wide field of
litigation. Unilateral conduct is probably the most common type of
conduct in the economy. If a patent holder is potentially liable for
105. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1197 (2d Cir. 1981).
106. Id.
107. Id.




112. See Kodak I, 125 F.3d 1195.
1998]
unilateral conduct based on a patent then nearly any action by a
patent holder could lead to a lawsuit from its competitors. The Ninth
Circuit recognized that under current law "the defense of
monopolization claims will rest largely on the legitimacy of asserted
business justifications." '113 Since such claims rest on highly disputed
factual issues the Ninth Circuit feared that its holding would open up a
flood of litigation and denigrate the value of patents.1 1 4 To prevent
this, the Ninth Circuit adopted a presumption that "a monopolist's
'desire to exclude others from its [protected] work is a presumptively
valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers.' 11 5
1. Conduct Requirement
The Ninth Circuit's concern is valid, but perhaps a little
overstated. The stringent conduct requirement of a monopolization
claim protects patent holders from liability for most conduct. As
demonstrated by Data General, Miller Insituform, and SCM, the mere
exercise of patent rights within the confines of the patent is not
exclusionary or predatory conduct. As such, it cannot violate antitrust
laws.
Consider again the Microsoft toolbox example. Microsoft's
refusal to license the toolbox to other software developers pushes
them out of the software market. This conduct expands Microsoft's
control over downstream markets. This conduct transforms the
breadth of Microsoft's patent, from the OS market into the software
market. This activity can be classified as predatory behavior.
Alternatively, if Apple Computer requested a license for the toolbox
in an effort to enable the MacOS to run Windows software, Microsoft
could refuse without violating antitrust law. Since both the toolbox
and the MacOS are used in the operating system market, Microsoft's
refusal to license would only be an exercise of its competitive
advantage. Such conduct is not predatory and cannot lead to liability
for monopolization.
2. Patent Power
The Ninth Circuit also expressed concern about the impact its
ruling would have on innovation encouraged by patents." 6 If the
113. Kodak 11, 125 F.3d 1217.
114. Id. at 1217-18.
115. Id. at 1218 (citing Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147,
1187 (1st Cir. 1994)).
116. Id.
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ruling did open up patent holders to a flood of litigation, that would
detract from the incentive to risk the large costs of developing a
patentable product. 117 Such an effect would be contrary to the shared
goals of patent and antitrust laws because it would discourage
innovation.
118
Even if the Ninth Circuit's holding did open up patent holders to
greater liability, they would still have enormous patent protection.
Patent holders have the right to exclude others from making or using
their products, and they retain the sole right to license their
inventions. 119 At worst, fear of liability for unilateral conduct would
lead patent holders to license their patents to competitors. The strict
requirements to prove an antitrust violation militate against this
possibility, but, even if they didn't, the patent holder would still be
entitled to licensing fees.
3. Valid Business Justification
Patent holders are also protected by the valid business
justification defense. An antitrust claimant already has to show
predatory conduct by the alleged monopolist. 2 ' Even if the claimant
can demonstrate anti-competitive conduct, the alleged monopolist
then has the ability to rebut the claims by showing a pro-competitive
purpose. 121 Where the conduct at issue revolves around a patent, the
holder is likely to be able to show that its conduct was merely an
exercise of a competitive advantage, and thus was not predatory.
Though the patent alone does not immediately justify any potentially
anti-competitive conduct, it does tend to negate any contention of
predatory purpose.
4. Reverse Presumption
The protection of the conduct requirement, patent power, and
valid business justification defense aside, the presumption formulated
in Data General and adopted and modified in Kodak makes sense.
The protections alone almost create a presumption that unilateral
exercise of patent rights is not anti-competitive independent of any
formal holding. It is at least implied by the conduct requirement and
the justification defense. The conduct element of a monopolization
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1996).
120. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
121. See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 483-84.
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claim requires that a claimant show predatory conduct. The majority
of unilateral exercises of patent rights are done for the purpose of
maintaining a competitive advantage within the scope of the patent.
Since exercising a competitive advantage alone is insufficient to
constitute monopolization, 122 such conduct will rarely meet the
elements of an antitrust claim. Even when a claimant can show
potentially predatory conduct, the alleged monopolist has the
opportunity to offer a justification for that conduct. 123
Given these protections, it seems almost natural to explicitly
create a presumption. Though it may be unnecessary, it simplifies
cases involving an intersection of patent rights and antitrust duties by
making clear what type of conduct will likely be protected. A
presumption also reassures patent holders that they will not be held
liable for simply exercising the competitive advantage granted them
by the patent laws. There should be no harm in such a presumption
since it is already implicit in existing law.
In Kodak II, the Ninth Circuit held the lower court in error for
failing to instruct the jury on this presumption. 124 However, it
correctly considered that error harmless. 125 Like any presumption, the
presumption that a refusal to license a patent is justified is rebuttable.
Though the Kodak jury was not specifically instructed as to the
presumption, it did hear arguments from Kodak that protecting its
intellectual property was a valid business justification. 126 The jury
rejected this justification as pretextual. 127 In doing so, the jury
implicitly accepted the ISOs' argument that Kodak's purpose was to
leverage the service market and that its conduct was therefore
predatory.
Kodak II demonstrates that when a claimant raises allegations of
leveraging it will most likely overcome the presumption that a refusal
to license is valid. The presumption is based upon the pro-competitive
exercise of the competitive advantage granted by a patent. To allege
leveraging, a claimant must show that a second market was involved
and that the alleged monopolist refused to deal so as to monopolize
that second market. If the claimant can demonstrate enough evidence
to make such a claim, the claimant will likely overcome the
122. See Spectrum Sports Inc. v. McQuillan 506 U.S. 447, 448 (1996); see also supra
note 28.
123. See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 483.






presumption. Evidence of leveraging indicates that the alleged
monopolist did not merely exercise patent rights, but expanded the
breadth of the patent grant for an anti-competitive purpose. While the
alleged monopolist still has the ability to raise justifications, the claim




Patent and antitrust laws inevitably conflict because of their
seemingly opposite means of reaching the same goal. The purpose of
each is to encourage competition and innovation, yet one approaches
that goal by creating quasi-monopolies while the other approaches it
by restricting monopolies. When tension between these two bodies of
law manifests itself in actual cases, it can be resolved by reference to
their shared goals. In SCM, the Second Circuit considered these
reciprocal goals when it held that "the primary purpose of the
antitrust laws to preserve competition can be frustrated, albeit
temporarily, by a holder's exercise of the patent's inherent
exclusionary power during its term." '128 The Court refused to adopt a
rule that patent law trumps antitrust law,129 instead recognizing that a
valid exercise of patent rights, within the scope of the patent, is pro-
competitive and therefore comports with the goals of antitrust laws,
even if it does not entirely comply with the letter of the law.
The Federal Circuit recognized the opposite end of the spectrum
in Atari:
When a patent owner uses his patent rights not only as a shield to
protect his invention, but as a sword to eviscerate competition
unfairly, that owner may be found to have abused the grant and may
become liable for antitrust violations when sufficient power in the
relevant market is present. 130
The Federal Circuit did not suggest that antitrust laws would always
limit patent rights. It simply recognized that a predatory exercise of
patent rights which extends the breadth of the patent is anti-
competitive and therefore conflicts with the goals of patent law, even
if it entirely complies with the letter of the law.
In Kodak H, the Ninth Circuit recognized this tension between
patent and antitrust law and resolved it by reference to their shared
128. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp, 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
129. Id. at 1204.
130. Atari Games Corp. V. Nintendo Of Am. Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
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goals. First, the Court reaffirmed the premise that a refusal to license
a patent, though arguably authorized by patent law, could be a
violation of antitrust law. To determine when such conduct rose to the
level of monopolization, the Ninth Circuit adopted a presumption.
That presumption supports a patent holder's refusal to license when
such conduct is confined to exercising the competitive advantage
granted by the patent. The presumption is rebuttable by evidence that
the patent holder's conduct extends the breadth of the patent and that
such conduct was engaged in for an anti-competitive purpose.
Evidence of leveraging will almost certainly rebut the presumption
because it demonstrates an extension of the patent into a secondary
market.
Though patents grant immense power to their holders, they are
by no means a license to kill the competition. Patent law encourages
people to put resources towards research and development by
rewarding their innovation with monopoly-like control over their
inventions. It encourages further development and disclosure by
granting a unique competitive advantage. When patent holders use
that advantage to try to expand their monopoly into downstream
markets, or for other anti-competitive purposes, they violate the spirit
of the patent law. Such conduct eliminates competitors, thereby
halting their innovation and reducing the need for a monopolist to
innovate to keep up. Though such monopolists may have a patent,
their conduct clearly violates antitrust laws and hampers the goals of
both bodies of law.
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